

Message Text

SECRET

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 8, 1975 (SALT
TWO-600)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 8, 1975.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
APRIL 8, 1975

I

MR. MINISTER,

ON APRIL 2, AS ON OTHER OCCASIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE
PRESENTED ITS VIEWS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF A "HEAVY ICBM"

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WND THE TERM "NON-HEAVY" WICH IS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DRAFT.

THE SOVIET STATEMENTS REGARDING THIS DEFINITION HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY STUDIED AND TODAY, BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE, I WANT TO SPEAK FURTHER ON THIS MATTER.

II

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED THAT THE MATTER OF "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY" MISSILES FULLY RESOLVED BY THE SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS PLACED ON THEIR LAUNCHERS IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT IS, HOWEVER, THE US VIEW THAT THIS ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED. THE POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE WAS FORESEEN BY THE US DURING SALT ONE AND WAS FORMALLY RECORDED AT THE TIME OF SIGNING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. YOU WILL RECALL THAT ON MAY 26, 1972 THE US NOTED ITS REGRET THAT THE SIDES WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A COMMON DEFINITION OF A "HEAVY MISSILE" AND STATED THAT, "THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER ANY ICBM HAVING A VOLUME SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST LIGHT ICBM NOW OPERATIONAL ON EITHER SIDE TO BE A HEAVY ICBM".

MR. MINISTER, YOU ARE AWARE THAT PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN IN THIS AREA. WE BELIEVE THESE PROBLEMS RESUPT FROM THE LACK OF AN AGREED DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM. THE US THEREFORE DIFFERS WITH THE SOVIET STATEMENTS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN "NO AMBIGUITIES OF ANY KIND" AND THAT THE VIABILITY OF THE TERMS "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY" HAS BEEN WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE CALLS "CONFIRMED".

III

IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE, WE BELIEVE THAT, WITHOUT A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM, A PROBLEM AREA WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROVISION PROHIBITING THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR NON-HEAVY ICBMS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS AND THE PROVISION PERMITTING MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT. IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE PROVISIONS WILL BE SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT, AS THEY ARE NOW IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS THE QUESTION REMAINS, WHAT WILL BE PERMITTED IN THE COURSE OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT IN VIEW OF THE PROHIBITION CARRIED OVER

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FROM ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. MISSILES WITH CAPABILITIES CONSIDERABLY IN EXCESS OF THOSE PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED AS "LIGHT" CAN BE DEPLOYED IN LAUNCHERS ASSOCIATED WITH "LIGHT" ICBMS. THE US BELIEVES THAT A DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM IN THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL RESOLVE THIS QUESTION. ACCORDINGLY, A DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM IS INCLUDED IN ARTICLE II OF THE US DRAFT.

IN THE COURSE OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT, ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS CAN BE MODIFIED BY AN INCREASE IN THEIR DIMENSIONS AS PERMITTED UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE AGREED STATEMENT AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING. NEVERTHELESS, IF SUCH A MODIFICATION WERE TO RESULT IN THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR LIGHT ICBMS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR MODERN HEAVY ICBMS, IT WOULD STILL BE BARRED BY ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE LIMITATION ON INCREASE IN SILO DIMENSIONS THUS DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT EXISTS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROHIBITION OF ARTICLE II.

IV

THE US DRAFT SETS FORTH THE DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM WHICH WE BELIEVE IS CLEAR, PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET SIDE OBJECTS NOT ONLY TO OUR DESIRE TO DEFINE A "HEAVY ICBM"S , BUT ASSERTS THAT THE TERM "NON-HEAVY" AS APPLIED TO ICBMS IS "AMBIGUOUS AND DIFFUSE". IN SO DOING THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE SAME TIME CLAIMS THAT THE TERM "LIGHT" IS WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE CALLS A "PRECISE AND CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE TERM". THE US SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE TERM "LIGHT" IS NOT "PRECISE AND CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE". SINCE THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THIS TERM IS CLEAR, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF YOU WERE TO DEFINE WHAT YOU BELIEVE CONSTITUTES A "LIGHT" ICBM.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALSO ASSERTED THAT THE USE OF THE TERM "NON-HEAVY" IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AIDE MEMOIRE. THE US FAILS TO SEE ANY CONFLICT IN THE USE OF TERMS WHICH CAN CLARIFY THE MEANING OF PROVISIONS TO BE CARRIED OVER INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION I HAVE PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT THAT NEW SOVIET ICBM DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BLURRED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "LIGHT" AND "HEAVY" ICBMS WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME OF SIGNING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE US SIDE BELIEVES THAT,

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IN ORDER MORE ACCURATELY TO DESCRIBE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTING ICBMS, AND TO ESTABLISH A LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN "HEAVY" AND ALL OTHER ICBMS, A MUTUALLY AGREED DEFINITION OF "HEAVY ICBM" IS REQUIRED AND THE USE OF THE TERMS "HEAVY" AND "NON-HEAVY" IS IMPORTANT TO THAT DEFINITION.

V

MR. MINISTER, THERE IS GOOD PRECEDENT FOR THE US APPROACH. THE SIDES FOUND IT NECESSARY TO WORK OUT DEFINITIONS FOR THE BALLISTIC MISSILES ASSOCIATED WITH SLBM LAUNCHERS EVEN THOUGH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITED ONLY LAUNCHERS. HOWEVER, NO SUCH DEFINITION FOR THE MISSILES ASSOCIATED WITH LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS HAS BEEN FORMULATED. TODAY I HAVE PRESENTED REASONS WHY THE US BELIEVES THAT A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE

OBLIGATIONS BEING ASSUMED WITH RESPECT TO HEAVY ICBMS CAN BE
ACHIEVED ONLY IF A CLEAR AND PRECISE DEFINITION OF HEAVY ICBM IS
CONTAINED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. MR. MINISTER, I WILL LOOK
FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THE CONSIDERATIONS I HAVE
PUT FORTH TODAY.
JOHNSON

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